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Abstract—Device-to-device (D2D) communications in 5G net-
works will provide greater coverage, as devices will be acting
as users or relays without any intermediate nodes. However,
this arrangement poses specific security issues, such as rogue
relays, and is susceptible to various types of attacks (imperson-
ation, eavesdropping, denial-of-service), due to the fact that
communication occurs directly. It is also recommended to
send fewer control messages, due to authenticity- and secrecy-
related prevailing requirements in such scenarios. Issues re-
lated to IoT applications need to be taken into consideration as
well, as IoT networks are inherently resource-constrained and
susceptible to various attacks. Therefore, novel signcryption
algorithms which combine encryption with digital signatures
are required to provide secure 5G IoT D2D communication
scenarios in order to protect user information and their data
against attacks, without simultaneously increasing communi-
cation costs. In this paper, we propose LEES, a secure authen-
tication scheme using public key encryption for secure D2D
communications in 5G IoT networks. This lightweight solu-
tion is a hybrid of elliptic curve ElGamal-Schnorr algorithms.
The proposed scheme is characterized by low requirements
concerning computation cost, storage and network bandwidth,
and is immune to security threats, thus meeting confidential-
ity, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation-related criteria
that are so critical for digital signature schemes. It may be
used in any 5G IoT architectures requiring enhanced D2D se-
curity and performance.
Keywords—5G networks, authentication, D2D communication,
IoT, lightweight cryptography.
1. Introduction
Device-to-device (D2D) communication is a novel technol-
ogy available in 5G networks, allowing two devices located
nearby to communicate without approaching the base sta-
tion. It is a boon for areas with low or no coverage. Smart-
phones and IoT devices may act as small base stations,
providing all connectivity-related benefits of a 5G network
to nearby devices, thus enhancing coverage. Two types of
D2D communications are possible, as shown in Fig. 1,
namely inband and outband. The inband scenario uses the
licensed spectrum and may be divided into non-overlapping
portions of D2D (overlay) or may not be divided at all (un-
derlay). Outband communication uses the unlicensed spec-
trum and helps eliminate interference caused by such de-
vices as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, etc. It is further divided into
controlled (where D2D communication is controlled by the
network) or autonomous (where D2D control is left to
users) varieties.
Fig. 1. Types of D2D communication.
In D2D communication, the devices act as relays. They
may either be a transparent relay (TR), simply amplify-
ing and forwarding the message, or a non-transparent relay
(NTR), decoding and forwarding the message. Problems
appear when these NTR-type relays become rouge and jeop-
ardize the entire network, resulting in various security at-
tacks. The situation gets aggravated since these devices are
resource-constrained, with very limited computational and
storage power. So, any new information security algorithms
developed for the purpose of this scenario would need to
be computationally lightweight. Authenticated encryption
algorithms and digital signatures need to be used in any
data transfers to secure these against common attacks and
to maintain confidentiality, privacy and authenticity of the
data involved.
Public key encryption and digital signatures are the key
pillars of modern cryptography. In a real-world scenario,
when two parties are communicating over a wireless com-
munication channel which may be insecure, the encryption
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algorithms data confidentiality of data and the digital sig-
natures provide data authentication. Elliptic curve cryp-
tography (ECC) was developed in 1985 and is one of the
most widely used public key cryptography schemes. Finite
keys are one of the main features in the algebraic structure
of the solution. Its key sizes and the security level that it
offers make it more popular compared to other algorithms.
ElGamal is also a public key cryptographic technique but
is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. There are
a few approaches to applying ECC combined with either
ElGamal or Schnorr [1], both offering promising results,
but no references are available in connection with combin-
ing elliptic curve-based ElGamal with Schnorr.
Taking this forward, in this paper we present LEES –
a lightweight authentication scheme for secure D2D com-
munications in 5G IoT networks. It is a hybrid implemen-
tation of ECC ElGamal encryption and the Schnorr digital
signature scheme.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 discusses the related work and is followed
by a discussion on security considerations in D2D commu-
nication, presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the
encryption and various digital signature scheme preliminar-
ies along with the notations used in this paper. Section 5
presents the system model, while Section 6 presents the
implementation schema. Section 7 discusses the results,
while the overall conclusion is presented in Section 8.
2. Related Work
Verifying user identity as part of the authentication process,
hiding sensitive information to ensure anonymity, preserv-
ing data confidentiality and integrity through the use of
encryption, hash functions or message authentication, as
well as optimized and cost-effective implementation meth-
ods are the topics outlined in the security-related consid-
erations of the authors o of [2]. Paper [3] proposes a se-
cure service-oriented authentication framework, where fog
nodes that are responsible for forwarding data in a 5G net-
work use a slice selection mechanism that ensures preser-
vation of privacy. The Diffie-Hellman based [1] present
a security analysis of two schemes: the Huang-Chang con-
vertible signcryption scheme (which serves as a basis for
the Schnorr signature) and the Kwak-Moon group signcryp-
tion scheme. The results show that both schemes are inse-
cure. The Huang-Chang scheme fails to ensure confiden-
tiality, while the Kwak-Moon scheme does not satisfy the
properties of unforgeability, coalition-resistance, and trace-
ability in its current form.
Paper [4] identifies the keyescrow problem of major cryp-
tographic schemes and proposes a certificate-less signature
scheme (CLS) for lightweight devices in Industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT). In this procedure the keys are retained dur-
ing the post-decryption phase and an authorized entity has
access to these, but under a few predefined conditions. The
scheme enables the selection of keys based on exponentials
and ensures integrity through the use of hash functions.
This pairing-based scheme is proven to be secure against
type I and type II adversaries under the extended bilinear
strong Diffie-Hellman (EBSDH) and bilinear strong Diffie-
Hellman (BSDH) assumptions.
Article [5] proposes that validity of each participating user
equipment (UE) be authenticated by 5G authentication and
key agreement (AKA) only once during its life time, and
that these checks be performed before generating a D2D
token. The base stations communicate their public key
through elliptic-curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)
to generate the D2D token. The D2D communication pro-
cess comprises three stages [6], the first one consists in
discovering the device that identifies nodes in its proximity
by sending out a request message in the broadcast mode.
A nearby node responds with a D2D token and UE identity
subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) in an encrypted
form. The link setup phase comes next, where each node
sends SUCI and the D2D token to the base station for ver-
ification. After verification, the secret keys are exchanged
using the elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm.
The last step is the secure data transmission stage that re-
lies on the authenticated encryption with associated data
(AEAD) cipher to encrypt the data using the D2D token,
before transmitting the data. However, 5G AKA has limi-
tations and is susceptible to replay attacks. Hence, alterna-
tives need to be looked at, and this is precisely the goal of
this paper.
3. Security Considerations
Digital signature schemes are one of the most important
cryptographic primitives enabled by public-key cryptogra-
phy. These methods allow messages to be authenticated
through the use of asymmetric encryption systems in which
the sender and the receiver are not required to share a com-
mon but secret key. Digital signatures are cryptographic
primitives which play a fundamental role in ensuring en-
tity authentication, data origin authentication, data integrity
and non-repudiation. Functionalities provided by a digital
signature can be summarized as follows:
• Authentication. A private key of the sender is used
to sign the message, thus authenticating the source
of the message. The private key is not shared with
anyone. It is known to the sender only. It can be
verified by anyone by decrypting it with the use of
the sender’s public key.
• Integrity. Integrity is the most important property of
the message, as it ensures that the data has not been
compromised. Integrity may be ensured by digitally
signing the message. The signature is generated with
respect to the data contained in the message. If the
message is altered, the receiver may easily determine
that at the time of verification. It is extremely chal-
lenging to alter the message or its signature without
the knowledge of the private key. Hence, the data is
unaltered during the transmission.
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• Non-repudiation. This characteristic ensures the in-
tegrity of data and guarantees that a third party will
be able to verify the source of data and its integrity.
It ensures that the sender cannot deny sending of the
message/data. And this is basically supported by dig-
itally signing the message with the help of a private
key of the sender itself. When the receiver performs
verification using the public key of the sender, a proof
is obtained that the message/data has been sent by the
same sender. Hence, denying the message becomes
impractical.
In general, each algorithm used for signing a message will
comprise two different key processes: one for signing and
the other for verifying the message at the other end. Below,
various security threats that loom large over D2D commu-
nications are enumerated.
3.1. Attacks in D2D Communications
Security threats in D2D communications are primarily re-
lated to the fact that the process is based on radio trans-
missions [5]. The most common types of attacks include
the following:
• Eavesdropping – in this attack the intruder is able
to listen-in without the actual participating devices
(PDs) being aware of that fact. If confidentiality of
cryptographic data is maintained, this attack may be
thwarted.
• Impersonation – the intruder comes across as a valid
participating device – or worse the base station (BS) –
and steals data. If cryptographic authentication is
enforced, this attack may be thwarted.
• Forgery – the intruder may send forged or malicious
content to all participating devices, thereby confus-
ing the entire system. If cryptographic data integrity
via digital signature is enforced, this attack may be
thwarted.
• Control data – the attacker may change the con-
trol data itself. Cryptographic techniques, such as
authentication, confidentiality and integrity, are re-
quired to thwart this attack.
• Denial of service (DoS) – this kind of attack may
render a service unavailable. Cryptographic actions,
such as authentication, confidentiality and integrity
are needed to thwart this attack.
3.2. Attack Resiliency
To cope with the attacks listed above and to secure D2D
communications, it is worth looking at some attack re-
siliency requirements suggested in [4], [7], [8]:
• Authentication – identity check of participating de-
vices performed on a frequent basis.
• Data confidentiality – data sent between participat-
ing devices should be encrypted.
• Data integrity – data sent with the use of authenti-
cated devices should be verified to ensure it has not
been tampered with.
• Privacy – all confidential information of partici-
pating devices must be kept secret, e.g. number, lo-
cation, etc.
• Traceability – the source of malicious messages
should be traceable.
• Anonymity – identity of participating devices
should not be disclosed to neighboring devices or
to intruders.
• Non-repudiation – a digital signature is an effec-
tive solution for both transmission and reception non-
repudiation, wherein one can stop the participating
devices from saying no to transmitting or receiving
a message.
• Revocability – revoking privileges of participating
devices in the event of a malicious D2D service.
4. Preliminaries and Notations
4.1. Encryption and Digital Signature Schemes
There are many digital signature schemes, with ElGamal,
elliptic curve and Schnorr algorithms being the most pop-
ular of them. The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) is based on the modified digital signature algo-
rithm (DSA). It works on elliptic curves that are defined
over a mathematical group and discrete logarithmic prob-
lems for its key formats. The smaller footprints and effi-
ciency of elliptic curve cryptography have led to its wide-
spread adoption.
ElGamal combines the discreet logarithmic problem and
the algebraic properties of modular exponentiation. At the
core of the algorithm is a key pair which includes a pri-
vate and a public key. When the sender sends a message,
a digital signature is generated for it by the private key.
Verification of the signature is carried out using the public
key of the signer. The three key properties that a digital
signature is supposed to offer, i.e. authentication, integrity,
and nonrepudiation, are ensured by the digital signature
in this case. The ElGamal signature algorithm is rarely
used in practice. The ECDSA and other variants are used
on a much wider scale. However, it is worth mentioning
that ElGamal encryption, i.e. an asymmetric key encryp-
tion algorithm, is widely used in public key cryptography.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange forms the basis of this
scheme.
The Schnorr signature offers numerous advantages over
ECDSA and ElGamal signatures. It is an amalgamation of
these schemes that is much simpler and faster. Its proven
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security record is another of its advantages, provided that
a random hash function with sufficient entropy is used
with a sufficiently hard elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP). There is no security proof for ECDSA,
however there is a definitive proof for Schnorr, according
to which breaking the Schnorr algorithm implies breaking
the discrete logarithmic problem. The linearity property is
another key advantage of the Schnorr signature.
The parameters and notations used in the paper are de-
scribed in Table 1.
Table 1




G Generator point on elliptic curve
msg Message
H ′ Hash(msg)





In ElGamal and ECDSA, the need to find the signature re-
quires a division of the random nonce. Since it is a modulo
operation, performance suffers, as an extended Euclidean
algorithm or Fermat’s little theorem may be required, call-
ing for plenty of multiplication operations to be performed.
The Schnorr signature is linear with no modulo division,
thus making the process simpler and faster. ECDSA relies
on a modulo division over different random nonces, making
it difficult to add up ECDSA signatures. Schnorr’s linear
property makes it feasible to add up Schnorr signatures.
This linearity makes it possible for multiple participating
entities to collaboratively produce a signature for the sum
of their public keys.
Considering the above as a motivation, lightweight elliptic
ElGamal Schnorr-based authentication scheme is proposed
(LEES).
5. System Model
The proposed model comprises the participating devices
(PD) or a relay which provides coverage and connectivity
to nearby devices (Fig. 2). A base station (BS) is a high
computation node deployed by the mobile network service
provider. There is a certification authority (CA) which is
responsible for issuing certificates to all communicating
nodes. As a pre-requisite for communication, the nodes
(including PD and BS) have to register with the CA being
responsible for whitelisting the public keys of all the nodes
in the network. Thus, to avoid the key escrow problem,
PD and BS generate their private and public keys. This
generation of keys is not shouldered by CA.
Fig. 2. System model diagram of the proposed solution.
6. Implementation
The proposed signcryption scheme is a hybrid implemen-
tation of the elliptic curve-based ElGamal encryption algo-
rithm fused with the Schnorr digital signature scheme for
enhanced security. The choice is based on the proven secure
nature of the ElGamal cryptosystem and on the security of
the Schnorr signature scheme. However, user identity is
sent in plain text in this technique. Later it was refined
with encrypted ID, but it still remains susceptible to replay
attacks.
The proposed system may be split into four stages:
Stage 1 – yoke stage,
Stage 2 – entity detection stage,
Stage 3 – corroboration stage/trust establishment stage,
Stage 4 – secure data communication stage.
We assume that the 5G-AKA+ authentication and privacy
preserving protocol is used prior to this stage or in accor-
dance with this stage, so as to establish a foundation for
secure communications ahead. We use the ElGamal pub-
lic key as the encryption and decryption algorithm. The
parameters generated at this stage are listed in Table 2.
Table 2
Parameters generated at the setup stage
Parameter Description
a A huge prime number
b A huge prime factor of (a−1)
c An integer which is of the order b mod a
h() A secure one-way hash function
KH One-way hash function with a key K
(E,D) E encipher and D decipher
Here, two keys using public key infrastructure (PKI) are
generated initially by the base station and participating de-
vices and certified by the certifying authority. This stage
can then be split as shown below:
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KeyGen PD. Let KPD and PPD be the private and public
key of the PD (sender) certified by CA:
PD = (KPD,PPD) , (1)
where PPD= C
−KPD mod a.
Initially, when PD wants to communicate with BS, PD
computes points on the elliptic curve (EC) which are then
broadcast with base point F after periodic intervals. To
compute KPD from a field JN (1< KPD< N) JN , the public
KPD is computed as:
PPD = KPD ·G . (2)
KeyGen BS. Let KBS and PBS be the private and public
key of the BS (receiver) certified by CA:
BS = (KBS,PBS) , (3)
where PBS= C
−KBS mod a.





mod a . (4)
Divide K into K1 and K2 of suitable length and:
x = KHK1(msg) , (5)
y = r +(d ·KPD) mod b , (6)
z = EK1(msg) , (7)
which is the ElGamal encryption of the plaintext with K1
key.
A time stamp (TS) is added and the PD sends (x,y,z,TS)
to the BS.
The unsigncryption stage. To recover the plaintext msg






mod a . (8)
Split K in K1 and K2, compute:
msg = DK1(z) (9)
where msg is assumed to be a valid message if
KHK2(msg) = x.
As mentioned above, for encryption and decryption algo-
rithms, we use the ElGamal public key. For public key
cryptography needs, this is an asymmetric key encryption
algorithm. It has two other advantages. Firstly, since it
is based on solving the difficult discrete logs in a large
prime modulus, its security is tight. Secondly, its encryp-
tion is probabilistic, which ensures that the same plaintext
produces a new cipher text every time encryption occurs.
The algorithm may be divided into three key elements: key
generator, encipher, and decipher.
• Key generation. Select a random x from 1, . . . , b and
determine h = cx.
• Encipher. Select y from 1, . . . , b−1, determine C1 =
Cx mod a nd A = PxPD mod b. Change the secret
message msg into a factor msg′ of B. Determine
C2 = (A.msg) mod b. The cipher text is (C1,C2).
• Decipher. Calculate the shared secret S = Cx1 and
compute msg′ = C2S−1, where S−1 is the inverse of
S in group B.
The message is then converted back into plaintext message
msg by the BS.
In the event of any dispute, the BS just needs to change
a valid cipher text into a signature which can be verified
publicly to satisfy a third-party certifying authority that
the cipher text is, as a matter of fact, generated by the
participating device only.
7. Result and Analysis
The proposed scheme scores well on both computation cost
and memory consumption. This is due to the fact that LEES
uses ECC, as this operation forms an Abelian group due to
it being performed in a finite field. Hence, both addition
and multiplication of points are different and faster from
normal multiplication. It is lightweight and does not suf-
fer from a lower security level in spite of ECC keys being
shorter compared to RSA/DH, as shown in Fig. 3. There-
fore, LEES usage leads to lower computational overheads
and eases the handling of keys, since the number of bits
required is lower compared to RSA/DH. This leads us to
conclude that even memory consumption and network traf-
fic will be reduced significantly as a lower number of bits
is sent.
Fig. 3. Comparison of key size of ECC and RSA/DH.
In the proposed scheme, we used 5G-AKA+ for primary au-
thentication of a PD before initiating the D2D setup stage.
This framework, available in 5G networks, offers unlink-
ability and also satisfies both efficiency and design draw-
backs in 5G-AKA. Moving forward, secondary authentica-
tion is performed by the CA based on the private and pub-
lic keys generated by the PD and BS. This is followed by
signcryption and unsigncryption stages which encrypt/de-
crypt messages using the ElGamal algorithm and verify
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the Schnorr digital signature before the receiver receives
any data. Thus, authentication takes place at each stage,
thereby ensuring secure D2D communications.
Except for PD, any attacker (including BS) cannot forge
a valid cipher text (x,y,z) for any message msg, such that
the verification equations mentioned above are all satisfied.
Also, except for the designated receiver, i.e. the BS, no
third-party can derive the message msg from the cipher
text (x,y,z).
5G networks inherently provide encrypted identity and thus
anonymity to PD. In addition, the private and public key of
PD and BS is unique and certified by CA. Further data sent
by PD is encrypted with private key of BS, which offers
further anonymity to PD.
Once BS reveals a triple (msg,y,z), anyone can verify that
(y,z) is PD’s signature. Hence, an authority may settle any
potential disputes between PD and BS.
LEES authentication and data encryption processes are de-
signed using a lightweight cryptographic protocol. It is
lightweight, since it uses a ECC-based public key cryp-
tosystem which utilizes only a 256 bit key compared to
a 1024 bit RSA key offering the same level of security.
Since all 5G IoT devices will be resource-constrained, the
lightweight cipher used in LEES works efficiently by en-
suring data confidentiality, integrity and authentication.
7.1. Analysis Based on Security Against Key Attacks
Impersonation attack. LEES is robust against imperson-
ation attacks. This is a common problem in D2D commu-
nications with devices acting as relays. As per the proposed
scheme, this is avoided in a two-step approach. Firstly, the
PD will encrypt the message by its private key. The re-
ceiving BS fetches the public key PPD from the whitelist
maintained by the CA. This does not allow it to open the
message and decryption fails. Thus, LEES is secure against
impersonation attacks.
Baby step and giant step (BSGS) method. The solution
proposed by Shank helps solve the DLP problem by focus-
ing on collisions and by minimizing complexity at approx.
by
√
N times, which is almost 50% of the original size. If
a 192-bit curve is used, considering
√
N, we get 1016 points,
which will require 1021 bytes for storing the hash – a re-
sult that is much lower compared to the proposed scheme
which works out to the order of 10156 attempts, thus making
it impossible to guess the key.
Brute force attack. An intruder may lay its hands on the
public key of PD and BS and, say, also the base point F
on the elliptic curve EC. If it obtains access to the private
key of BS (PBS), then the entire network is compromised.
If PPD is accessed, the small network that PD is serving
gets compromised. However, since LEES uses ECC for
key selection, is based on DLP and the key size is over 384
bits, the network is secured against such attacks.
Pollard’s Rho method. It is a lightweight attack. It per-
forms two operations called parallelization and random
walk. It attempts to reduce to the square root of the at-
tack to find the secret key. Since LEES uses ECC, it needs
to be mentioned that the key size of ECC is ∼ 571 bits,
which is equal to around 15360 bits of RSA as shown in
Table 3. Therefore, considering the first key and taking
its square root, the problem becomes unfeasible to solve.
As seen in Fig. 3, the size of RSA increases significantly
compared to ECC, which increases moderately.
Table 3
LEES vs. RSA/DH key comparison




Relay attack. Here, the intruder saves the accessed mes-
sage and sends it at some other time intervals, leading to
great losses. To avoid such attacks, a time stamp is intro-
duced in (x,y,z,TS) during the signcryption stage. Based
on the session, the time to live (TTL) is calculated and,
if the difference between the current time and the message
time is greater than TTL, the message is considered to be
a fresh message. Otherwise, it is a stale message.
7.2. Analysis of Authentication Overhead
Generally, four steps are involved in a normal authentication
process to ensure a secure transmission. However, in the
proposed scheme, communication may be of the occur in
one-step only, or in two-steps maximum, to deliver the ci-
pher text and to perform authentication. Therefore, a com-
parison between LEES and other contemporary schemes
shows that the communication overhead and, thereby, net-
work bandwidth are highly reduced, by up to four times,
without compromising security. Hence, the solution is
lightweight. Also, a comparison between LEES and other
contemporary designs, such as the ultra-lightweight mutual
authentication protocol (ULMAP) and the session initia-
tion protocol (SIP), shows that the proposed scheme out-
performs the above solutions in term of the number of mes-
sages exchanged with almost the same level of trust and
security, as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Comparison of authentication message overhead.
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8. Conclusion
The scheme developed has been analyzed in terms of its
key parameters: computational overhead, security, key at-
tacks and authentication overhead. It is observed that LEES
requires less computational resources and eases the han-
dling of keys, since the number of bits required is lower by
a factor compared to RSA/DH. This leads us to conclude
that even memory consumption and network traffic will
be significantly reduced, as lower number of bits are sent.
The analysis of the proposed scheme focusing on attack re-
siliency shows that it offers, when implemented, good lev-
els of authentication, data confidentiality, anonymity and
efficiency. In terms of protection against attacks, it has
been determined as being secure against most attacks. Fi-
nally, a comparison between LEES and other algorithms
showed that the communication overhead and, thereby, net-
work bandwidth are highly reduced (by as much as four
times) with LEES, without compromising security.
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